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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes an explanation of the international home bias in equity based on ambiguity aversion.
Doubts imply an additional hedging motif driven by the interaction between real exchange rate risk
and ambiguity aversion. What matters is the long-run as opposed to the short-run risk. Domestic equity
is a good hedge with respect to long-run real exchange rate risk even when bonds are traded. The higher
is the degree of ambiguity aversion, the stronger is the home bias. We identify the degree of ambiguity
aversion with detection error probabilities and show that our framework is able to explain a large share
of the observed US home bias, as well as other stylized facts on US cross-border asset holdings.
Without doubts, a standard open-economy macroeconomic model would be unsuccessful along all
these dimensions.
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The lack of international diversiﬁcation in equity portfolios is one of the most persistent observa-
tions in international ﬁnance. Investors hold a large share of their wealth in domestic securities,
more than what would be dictated by the share of these securities in the world market. This is
known as the “the home-bias puzzle” (French and Poterba, 1991, Tesar and Werner, 1995).
We address this puzzle by introducing doubts in a standard open-economy model along the
lines of Hansen and Sargent (2005, 2007).1 Agents are endowed with a reference probability
distribution which they do not trust. They express their doubts by surrounding the reference
probability distribution with a set of nearby distributions. They fear this possible model mis-
speciﬁcation and end up following the worst distribution in the set of surrounding distributions.
This environment can account for an undiversiﬁed portfolio and home-bias in assets holdings.
Our explanation relies on the interaction between natural asymmetries, characterizing open
economies, and model uncertainty. Both features are necessary for our result. In particular,
we stress the importance of ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rate as the key asymmetry driving
our results.2
Agents enter ﬁnancial markets with diﬀerent appetites for state-contingent wealth, and asset
trading provides a way to reduce such diﬀerences. In a standard model, the appetite for wealth
is driven by the marginal utility of consumption and indeed asset trading helps to reduce the
idiosyncratic movements in the marginal utilities across countries. With model uncertainty,
diﬀerences in the appetite for wealth can also be driven by diﬀerences in the beliefs. Ambiguity-
averse agents are worried about bad news regarding their consumption proﬁles. Cross-country
variations in beliefs translate into bad news about the cross-country diﬀerences in consumption
growth. The real exchange rate is a source of ﬂuctuations for relative consumption growth and
an additional source of risk with respect to those driving the diﬀerences in the marginal utility
of consumption.3 Agents use portfolio holdings to hedge this risk and can bias their choices
towards domestic asset. We provide empirical support for this result.
Hedging real exchange rate has been a popular argument for explaining asset home bias since
the work of Adler and Dumas (1983). However, in their model, this channel follows from the
desire of reducing the idiosyncrasies in the marginal utility of consumption across countries, while
in our model it is driven by the wedge in the distorted beliefs. This is more than a subtlety. In
their framework, to be able to account for some home bias, the risk-aversion coeﬃcient should
increase, at the cost of raising in a counterfactual way the mean of the risk free rate, the so-called
risk-free rate puzzle (Weil, 1989). In our model, instead, the relevant parameter is the degree of
ambiguity aversion – a measure of the size of the set of nearby probability distributions– which
can increase without falling in the risk-free rate puzzle. The result of home bias depends on
degrees of ambiguity aversion which are consistent with reasonable values of the detection error
probability that agents face when confronting the reference and the subjective measures.
A more recent literature has de-emphasized hedging real exchange rate as a relevant channel
to explain asset home bias (see van Wincoop and Warnock, 2006, 2008), because in the data the
1An incomplete list of papers that have tried to address the home-bias puzzle are: Benigno and Kucuk-Tuger
(2008), Bottazzi et al. (1998), Coeurdacier (2005), Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009), Coeurdacier et al. (2007),
Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Engel and Matsumoto (2006), Epstein and Miao (2003), Heathcote and Perri (2004),
Kollmann (2006), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001), Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), Uppal (1993).
2Deviations from purchasing power parity have been the subject of an extensive literature in open-economy
macroeconomics, see Rogoﬀ (1996).
3Even if the cross-country marginal utility of consumption might be also driven by real exchange rate ﬂuctu-
ations, this risk is not collinear to the one driving the cross-country diﬀerences in the beliefs. See Section 2 for
details.
1covariance between the real exchange rate and the excess return on foreign-versus-domestic equity
is negligible, conditional on the excess return on bonds. Our model emphasizes the importance
of long-run versus short-run real exchange rate risk. An important contribution, indeed, is to
show that the long-run risk is empirically relevant, even conditional on other excess returns, and
equities are a good hedge for this risk. This is key for our model to succeed in explaining the
home-bias puzzle.4
On the contrary, we ﬁnd that non-diversiﬁable labor-income risk is not suﬃcient to explain
asset home bias, conﬁrming previous results of Baxter and Jermann (1997) and in contrast to
recent ﬁndings of Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009). As a consequence, standard open-economy
macro models under rational expectations do not succeed in explaining the home-bias puzzle.
Finally, we show that ambiguity aversion is also able to reconcile the model with other
stylized empirical facts on US cross-border holdings that the rational-expectations benchmark
has diﬃculties in replicating. In particular, the US is a net creditor in equity instruments and a
net debtor in bond instruments, its position in foreign-currency bonds is about balanced, whereas
that in home-currency bonds is largely negative (Tille, 2005 and 2008).
The structure of this paper is the following. The next section gives the main intuition of
the results and discusses more extensively the contribution of the paper with respect to related
literature. Section 3 discusses the structure of model uncertainty. In Section 4 we present the
model. We contrast the equilibrium portfolio allocation implied by the standard framework
with rational expectations, in Section 5, with those implied by model uncertainty, in Section 6.
Section 7 presents the empirical relevance of the model.
2 Intuition and related literature
In this section, we provide the intuition of the main results of the paper and discuss the compar-
ison with related literature. A fundamental principle of ﬁnance, based on the arbitrage theory,
is that households want to hold assets that pay well when needed. A measure of the appetite
for wealth is given by the stochastic discount factor: the higher the stochastic discount factor in
a particular state of nature, the higher the appetite for wealth of the households in that state.
Therefore, when households have diﬀerent stochastic discount factors, they might exploit trade
in assets in order to hedge such diﬀerences. Indeed, when perfect risk-sharing is achieved, the
wedge between the stochastic discount factors across agents is completely eliminated. In partic-
ular, for agents trading in international assets, perfect risk-sharing requires equalization of the






where mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor for evaluating wealth in states of nature at time
t + 1 for the household of a generic country H, m
t+1 the respective factor for the household
4Our approach diﬀers from most of the existing literature which ﬁnds portfolio shares as a function of primitive
parameters, like the risk-aversion coeﬃcient, the share of traded goods, or the trade cost. This is clearly a
desirable feature of general equilibrium models, but it has the drawback of hiding the hedging relationships based
on observable variables that are at the root of the portfolio decisions. Van Wincoop and Warnock (2006, 2008)
show that the covariances between the asset returns and the sources of risk implied by these models are often
counterfactual: once data restrictions on asset prices are considered, these models fail to solve the portfolio
home-bias puzzle. On the other hand, the few contributions focusing on the hedging relationships that underlie
portfolio choices (such as Coeurdacier and Gourinchas, 2009 and van Wincoop and Warnock, 2006, 2008) typically
use static models, which, by construction, neglect any possible source of long-run risk.
2in country F and qt is the real exchange rate. In a consumption-based model, the stochastic
discount factors depend on the respective marginal utilities of consumption. In particular, in a
quite general model and in a log-linear approximation, deviations from full risk-sharing can arise
from three sources of risks:
lnmt+1 + lnqt+1   lnm
t+1 ' me(     
full)exrt+1 + mq"q;t+1 + ml"l;t+1: (1)
In the equation above, exrt+1 represents the vector of excess returns – the ﬁrst source of risk;
"q;t+1 is a measure of the real exchange rate risk and "l;t+1 of cross-country non-diversiﬁable
labor-income risk, expressed in units of the same consumption index;      
full captures the
deviations of the optimal steady-state portfolio from the one that achieves full diversiﬁcation;
ﬁnally, me;mq and ml depend on structural model parameters.5 When there is no real exchange
rate nor labor-income risk ("q;t+1 = "l;t+1 = 0 for all t), the optimal portfolio clearly implies full
diversiﬁcation:   =  
full. More generally, the real exchange rate risk is relevant only as long as
the risk-aversion coeﬃcient is diﬀerent from the unitary value (otherwise mq = 0). Departures
from full diversiﬁcation are optimal when excess returns display some covariance with the other
two sources of risk.6 Whichever channel is relevant and able to explain asset home bias is
therefore a question of empirical evaluation.
Real exchange rate risk and non-diversiﬁable labor-income risk have been widely explored
in the literature. However, neither of them is completely satisfactory. On the one hand, the
covariance between real exchange rate risk and the excess return on equities has been found to
be very small, conditional on the excess return on bonds. Accordingly, for this channel to be
empirically relevant, the degree of risk aversion should rise, to increase mq, but at the cost of
increasing also the mean of the risk-free rate implied by the model – the so-called risk-free rate
puzzle. On the other hand, the covariance between the labor-income risk and the excess return
on equities can be weak or strong. In particular, we show that results might depend on the
measure of labor-income risk used. Our model-based deﬁnition is not able to explain important
departures from full diversiﬁcation.
However, our explanation of the home-bias puzzle comes from a diﬀerent source through
model uncertainty and ambiguity aversion. Under model uncertainty agents in the two countries
can act according to diﬀerent subjective probabilities. The ﬁrst important consequence implied
by this environment is that perfect risk-sharing requires now the equalization of the stochastic






where gt+1 and g
t+1 are the changes of measure from the subjective distributions (which are
country-speciﬁc) to the reference one (which is instead common across countries). Accordingly,
agents face an additional hedging motif driven by the possible diﬀerence in the subjective prob-
ability measures.
Indeed, diﬀerences in the appetite for wealth now arise not only from possible diﬀerences in
the marginal utilities of consumption across countries – ﬁrst hedging motif, coming from (1) –
but also from diﬀerences in the probabilities agents assign to states of nature. More speciﬁcally,
5In our model, we consider trade in two equities and two bonds (one for each country) and therefore three
excess returns. The vector 
full has three dimensions and implies zero bond holdings and an equal split of equity
between countries. See Section 5 for details.
6When markets are incomplete, agents try to minimize the projection of the deviations from zero, described
by equation (1), on the space spanned by the asset payoﬀs.
3when agents are ambiguity averse, such subjective probabilities reﬂect the fear of model mis-
speciﬁcation, and are related to revisions in the path of consumption growth. Consequently, the
additional hedging motif is related to revisions in the relative cross-country consumption pro-
ﬁle. Indeed, ambiguity-averse agents will assign a high subjective probability to those states of
nature in which their consumption growth is lower than in the other country, and will therefore
want to invest more in assets that pay well precisely in those states of nature. In a log-linear
approximation, this additional hedging motif can be written as a linear function of the same
three sources of risk identiﬁed before
lngt+1   lng
t+1 ' (   1)[ge(     
full)exrt+1 + gq"q;t+1 + gl"l;t+1]; (2)
where   1 denotes the degree of ambiguity aversion, which we assume to be equal across
countries ( = ), and ge, gq and gl are parameters. The optimal portfolio now seeks to
“minimize” the sum of equations (1) and (2). In particular, with no real exchange rate nor labor-
income risk, the optimal portfolio still implies full diversiﬁcation, even with model uncertainty,
and for any degree of ambiguity aversion . Moreover, if there is labor-income risk but no real
exchange rate risk, the degree of ambiguity aversion still does not aﬀect the optimal portfolio
allocation. Indeed, we show that gl = ml and ge = me; and therefore that the two sources of
risk behind the two hedging motifs are collinear, implying the same portfolio. On the contrary,
gq is always diﬀerent from mq; hence, as long as there are ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rate,
the degree of ambiguity aversion does aﬀect the optimal portfolio allocation. This is particularly
evident in the case of log-utility (which is assumed throughout the paper) in which mq = 0
while gq =  1. Now  can increase to make the real exchange rate risk empirically more
relevant without raising the mean of the risk-free rate.7 Indeed, by calibrating  using detection
error probabilities, we show that reasonable values of ambiguity aversion are able to explain a
substantial degree of home bias in US equity holdings.
There is a related literature on ambiguity and portfolio choices. The most related papers are
Epstein and Miao (2003) and Uppal and Wang (2003). Epstein and Miao (2003) incorporate
Knightian uncertainty in a multi-agent model by allowing for multiple priors. They explain
home bias in asset holdings by assuming heterogeneity among agents concerning the degree of
ambiguity about returns. They do not consider natural asymmetries coming from open-economy
modeling and therefore "q;t+1 = "l;t+1 = 0 in their model. Instead, in our model, the implied
under-diversiﬁcation is not the result of an asymmetric attitude towards ambiguity across agents,
since we assume  = ; but the consequence of natural open-economy asymmetries, which we
show that are indeed relevant in the data. Uppal and Wang (2003), instead, analyzes a single-
agent partial equilibrium model with trading in multiple assets, in which the agent has diﬀerent
degrees of ambiguity aversion across the return processes of the various assets. As in Epstein
and Miao (2003), they too build key asymmetries in the degrees of ambiguity aversion, though
with respect to diﬀerent assets rather than across diﬀerent agents. Uppal and Wang (2003)
build on the framework proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2005, 2007), as we do, but to obtain
tractability they adopt a non-innocuous modiﬁcation of the original problem, as done also in
Manhout (2004, 2006). This makes our model and theirs not comparable.8 Our approach,
instead, adheres completely to the methodology of Hansen and Sargent (2005, 2007). In this
respect, a further methodological contribution of this paper is to derive a simple solution of
non-linear robust-control problems through approximation methods.
7See in particular Barillas et al. (2006) on this point.
8Indeed, they transform a constant lagrange multiplier into a time-varying function of the value function to
get a closed-form solution. Pathak (2002) describes the transformation employed by Maenhout (2004, 2006) and
Uppal and Wang (2003) as poorly motivated and explains in details the unappealing consequences.
43 Model Uncertainty
We characterize model uncertainty as an environment in which agents are endowed with some
probability distribution, but they are not sure that it is in fact the true data-generating one, and
might instead act using a nearby distorted “subjective” probability distribution.
Consider a generic state of nature st at time t and deﬁne st as the history st  [st;st 1;:::;s0].
Let agents be endowed with (st) as the “approximating” or “reference” probability measure on
histories st. Decision-makers may seek a diﬀerent probability measure, a “subjective” one, de-
noted by e (st) which is absolutely continuous with respect to the “approximating” measure.
Absolute continuity is obtained by using the Radon-Nykodym derivative.9 First, the two proba-
bility measures agree on which events have zero probability. Second, there exists a non-negative




G(st)(st) = 1 (3)







G(st)(st)X(st)  E(GtXt) (4)
in which E() and e E() denote the expectation operators under the “approximating” and “subjec-
tive” probability measures, respectively. Speciﬁcally, G(st) is a probability measure, equivalent
to the ratio e (st)=(st), that allows a change of measure from the “approximating” to the “sub-
jective” measure.





with the property Etgt+1 = 1. It follows that g(st+1jst) is equivalent to the likelihood ratio
e (st+1jst)=(st+1jst), and acts as a change of measure in conditional probabilities. High values
of g(st+1jst) imply that the decision-makers assign a higher subjective probability to state st+1
conditional on history st.
For each random variable Xt+1, therefore, the martingale increment gt+1 deﬁnes a mapping
between the conditional expectations under the two measures:
e Et(Xt+1) = Et(gt+1Xt+1); (5)
in which Et() and e Et() denote the conditional-expectation operators.
As in Hansen and Sargent (2005), we use conditional relative entropy as a measure of the
divergence between the “approximating” and “subjective” probabilities,
Et(gt+1 lngt+1);
which approximately measures the variance of the distortions in the beliefs. When there are
in fact no distortions this measure is zero: in this case, indeed, g(st+1jst) = 1 for each st+1.
In particular, since we are going to work with a dynamic model, in what follows, it is more
9This way of constructing subjective probability measures is borrowed from Hansen and Sargent (2005, 2007).









where 0 <  < 1. A high value of entropy can be interpreted as a very large divergence between
the “subjective” and the “approximating” beliefs. On the contrary a low value of entropy implies
beliefs that are not too distorted or dissimilar from the reference model.
4 Model
We consider a model with two countries, denoted domestic (H) and foreign (F), each populated
by a representative agent. Representative agents supply a ﬁxed amount of labor. In each coun-
try, there is a continuum of ﬁrms producing a continuum of goods in a market characterized
by monopolistic competition. All goods are traded. Households enjoy consumption of both do-
mestic and foreign goods and can trade in a set of ﬁnancial assets. Speciﬁcally, there are four
assets traded in the international markets: two risk-free nominal bonds, denominated in each
currency, and two equity assets, representing claims on the dividends of domestic and foreign
ﬁrms, respectively. In their consumption and portfolio decisions, households mistrust the ref-
erence probability distribution and therefore compute expectations according to the subjective
one.








where , with 0 <  < 1, is the intertemporal discount factor and e Et0() is the time t0 ex-
pectation operator taken with respect to the distorted probability measure. As discussed in the
previous section, this distorted measure is absolutely continuous with respect to the “reference”














where we have normalized Gt0 = 1. The representative agent in the other country has simi-
lar preferences but a possibly diﬀerent subjective probability measure and therefore a diﬀerent
expectation operator e E
t0().
The utility ﬂow is logarithmic in the consumption index c. The latter is a CES aggregator














in which n, with 0 < n < 1, is the weight given to the consumption of domestic goods and
#, with # > 0, is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods. The consumption sub-indexes cH and cF are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators of the continuum


















6where t is the time-varying elasticity of substitution across the continuum of measure one of
goods produced in each country, with t > 1, for all t. The appropriate consumption-based price
indices expressed in units of the domestic currency are deﬁned as
P 
h

















A similar structure of preferences holds for the foreign agent marked with the appropriate aster-
isks. In particular the weight n in the foreign consumption index might not be equal to n: In
the case in which n > n; home-bias in consumption arises. More generally when n 6= n; there
are deviations from purchasing-power parity and ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rate, even if
the law-of-one price holds for each traded good. In our model, this is a possible source of risk
to be hedged through portfolio choices. In particular, we will show that this channel, together
with model uncertainty, can explain home bias in asset holdings.10
In each country, there is a continuum of ﬁrms of measure one producing the goods in a
monopolistic-competitive market. A domestic ﬁrm of type h has a constant-return-to-scale pro-




t where Zt is a natural resource available in the country and
lt denotes labor which is employed at the wage rate Wt;  is a parameter with 0 <   1. When
 = 1, the model collapses to an endowment economy.
Prices are set without frictions and the law-of-one price holds. Equilibrium implies that
prices are equalized across all ﬁrms within a country and set as a time-varying markup t 










Firms make proﬁts and distribute them in the form of dividends. The aggregate dividends in
the domestic economy are given by




which displays a positive correlation between dividends and the mark-up. The existence of non-
diversiﬁable labor income is another source of risk to be hedged through portfolio choices.11
We indeed introduce mark-up shocks to allow for a possible negative correlation between labor
income and equity returns.12 However, we will show in our empirical analysis that in general
non-diversiﬁable labor income risk is not strong enough to explain home bias in asset holdings.
10Notice that we could have alternatively modeled variations in the real exchange rate through deviations from
the law-of-one price without aﬀecting our conclusions.
11When  = 1 we are in a pure endowment economy, in which all income is diversiﬁable. In this case t goes
to inﬁnity.
12Mark-up shocks can fall in the category of redistributive shocks, discussed by Coeurdacier et al. (2007) and
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009).
7The market of foreign goods works in a similar way with the appropriate modiﬁcations.
There are two equity markets – one for each country – with shares that are traded interna-
tionally. The market prices for equity shares in local currency are VH;t and V 
F;t for the domestic
and foreign country, respectively. Households can also trade in two risk-free nominal bonds,
denominated in units of the two currencies. The ﬂow-budget constraint of the domestic agent is
BH;t + StBF;t + xH;tVH;t + xF;tStV 
F;t  RH;tBH;t 1 + StR
F;tB
F;t 1
+ xH;t 1(VH;t + DH;t) + xF;t 1St(V 
F;t + D
F;t) + Wtlt   Ptct (9)
in which BH;t and BF;t are the amounts of one-period nominal bonds, in units of the two cur-
rencies, held at time t; RH;t and R
F;t are the risk-free returns from period t   1 to period t,
in the respective currencies; xH;t and xF;t are the shares of the domestic and foreign equity,
respectively, held by the domestic agent. Finally St is the nominal exchange rate, deﬁned as the
price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. The ﬂow-budget constraint (9) can be
written in a more compact form and in real terms – in units of the domestic consumption index
– as
at = rp;tat 1 + t   ct; (10)
where we have deﬁned
at 
















In the deﬁnition above, H;t; F;t, e
H;t, e
F;t represent the shares of wealth that the domestic
agent invests in the domestic bond, foreign bond, domestic equity and foreign equity, respectively,
satisfying the following restriction:
H;t + F;t + e
H;t + e




F;t are the respective real returns.13 The variable t denotes non-
diversiﬁable real labor income, deﬁned as t  Wtlt=Pt, and qt is the real exchange rate deﬁned
as qt  StP
t =Pt:
The domestic agent’s optimization problem is to choose consumption and the portfolio allo-
cations to maximize (7) under the ﬂow-budget constraint (10) and appropriate no-Ponzi game
conditions.
4.1 Optimality conditions
The optimality condition with respect to consumption implies an orthogonality condition, in
expectation, between the real stochastic discount factor and the real portfolio return
e Et(mt+1rp;t+1) = 1; (12)





13Lower-case variables denote the real counterpart of the respective upper-case variable. See the appendix for
details on the derivations and deﬁnitions.




p;t+1) = 1; (14)








The optimality conditions with respect to the portfolio allocation imply a set of four restrictions
for each agent, one for each asset, given by:






















































Equilibrium in the goods market requires the production of each good to be equal to world
consumption
yH;t = cH;t + c
H;t y
F;t = cF;t + c
F;t:
The labor markets are in equilibrium at the exogenously supplied quantities of labor
lt =  lt l
t =  l
t:
Bonds are in zero-net supply worldwide
BH;t + B
H;t = BF;t + B
F;t = 0:
Equity shares sum to one
xH;t + x
H;t = xF;t + x
F;t = 1:
Given the path of the stochastic disturbances f lt,  l
t, Zt; Z
t , t, 
tg, an equilibrium is an
allocation of quantities fct;cH;t, cF;t, c
t; c
H;t, c








t} and prices frH;t; r
F;t, re
H;t, re
F;t, qt, PH;t=PF;t;Wt=Pt, W
t =P
t g such that each agent’s
consumption, portfolio shares and wealth are optimal given prices, and goods, labor, and asset
markets are in equilibrium.
Although we have written a general equilibrium model, in the next section we show that
we do not really need to solve the entire model to understand the determinants of the portfolio
allocation. Instead, we can isolate a block of the general-equilibrium conditions to determine






F;t} by taking as given the path
of returns frH;t; r
F;t, re
H;t, re
F;t}, the real exchange rate qt and the processes of non-diversiﬁable
labor incomes ft;
tg: The optimal portfolio allocation, therefore, depends on the co-movements
between these sources of risk: Moreover, since all these variables are observable, we can use data
restrictions to evaluate the co-movements and the empirical relevance of the model.14
14Empirical restrictions of this kind should apply to any general equilibrium model of international portfolio
allocation. Indeed, recent papers in the literature characterize portfolio allocations in terms of primitive param-
eters or shocks, yet without considering such empirical restrictions. Along this dimension, they would be less
successful. See van Wincoop and Warnock (2006, 2008) and Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009) for a related
argument and for models that are instead evaluated under data restrictions.
95 The benchmark case of no model uncertainty
When there is no model uncertainty, investors fully trust the “reference” probability distribution
to be the true one, so that “approximating” and “subjective” measures coincide. For a generic
random variable Xt+1, it follows that e EtXt+1 = e E
t Xt+1 = EtXt+1:
Accordingly, we can characterize the equilibrium portfolio allocation combining equations (16)–









































The above conditions require the cross-country diﬀerence in the real stochastic discount factors –
evaluated in terms of domestic consumption – to be orthogonal to three relevant excess returns:
the domestic equity premium, the excess return on foreign versus domestic equity, and the
excess return on foreign versus domestic bonds. Indeed, conditions (20), (21) and (22) and
restriction (11) are suﬃcient to characterize the equilibrium portfolio allocation.
Given the assumption of incomplete markets, we cannot solve for the optimal portfolio al-
location in non-linear closed form.15 However, we can still derive many insights by using the
approximation methods developed by Devereux and Sutherland (2006) and Tille and van Win-
coop (2006). As a ﬁrst step, we solve for the paths of consumption and wealth, given returns
and the steady-state portfolio shares, using a ﬁrst-order approximation of the Euler equations
and the budget constraints. In particular, letting variables with hats denote log-deviations from
the steady state and variables with upper-bars the steady-state level, this yields to
^ mt+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ m
t+1 =  (^ cR









where s is the steady-state ratio between non-traded income and ﬁnancial wealth, which is com-
mon across countries and given by s   = a, and sc is the steady-state ratio between consumption
and ﬁnancial wealth and such that sc = (1   )= + s. Moreover,        

captures the

















H;t   ^ rH;t
^ re
F;t + ^ qt   ^ re
H;y
^ r
F;t + ^ qt   ^ rH;t
3
5:
15Van Wincoop and Warnock (2006, 2008) work with a closed-form solution, but in a partial-equilibrium
two-period model. Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009), Coeurdacier et al. (2007), Heathcote and Perri (2004),
Kollman (2006) obtain closed-form solutions by assuming that markets are locally complete.
16It can be shown that in a symmetric steady state in which  A =  S  A
,  
e
i = 1  
e
i and  

i =   i, for i = H;F.
10The deﬁnition of   implies that full diversiﬁcation is achieved when   =  
full = 0. Equa-
tion (23) is the equivalent of equation (1) and describes the ﬁrst hedging motif underlying port-
folio choices, related to diﬀerences in the marginal utilities of consumption. It shows that under
log utility the cross-country diﬀerences in the stochastic discount factors arise from two sources:
ﬂuctuations in the excess returns and cross-country variations in labor income. In particular,
"l;t+1 represents the news at time t+1 in the growth path of the cross-country non-diversiﬁable






t+1+k   ^ qt+1+k)   Et(^ 
R
t+1+k   ^ qt+1+k)]; (25)
which captures the source of labor-income risk relevant to our model.
As a second step, we use equation (23) and a second-order approximation of the orthogonal-
ity conditions (20)–(22) to determine the steady-state portfolio shares as a function of prices,
returns and non-diversiﬁable labor income.17 The optimal steady-state portfolio shares satisfy
the following equation




t Et(exrt+1  "l;t+1); (26)
where t is the time t conditional variance-covariance matrix of the vector of excess returns
exrt+1.
When s = 0, all income risk is tradeable. As argued in Section 2, the optimal portfolio
implies full diversiﬁcation:   = 0 and accordingly  e
i =  e
i = 1=2 and  i =  
i = 0, for
i = H;F. When there is non-diversiﬁable income, instead, the model implies a departure from
full diversiﬁcation that depends on the covariances between labor-income risk and the excess
returns.
The set of conditions in (26) can be written in a simpler form as
 e
H +  e
















































in which variances and covariances are conditional on the other excess returns and previous-
period information. We denote with exrde, exrie and exrib the excess returns on domestic
equity, international equity, and international bonds, respectively:
exrde
t+1  ^ re
H;t+1   ^ rH;t+1;
exrie
t+1  ^ re
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ re
H;t+1;
exrib
t+1  ^ r
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ rH;t+1:
Using (27) to (29) together with (11), we are able to determine the split of wealth across the
diﬀerent assets. In particular, equation (27) determines the share of ﬁnancial wealth invested in
17Details of the derivation are shown in the appendix.
11the equity market relative to the bond market: when s 6= 0 and "l;t+1 co-varies positively with
the excess return of domestic equity over domestic bonds, domestic agents will take an overall
long position in the bond markets ( H +  F > 0). In this case, indeed, in the face of a bad shock
to labor income, domestic bonds pay relatively better than equities: bonds are a better hedge
with respect to labor-income risk.
Equation (28), instead, determines the diversiﬁcation between domestic and foreign equi-
ties. In particular, to obtain home bias in equity, the excess return on international equity
should co-vary positively with the surprises in the cross-country diﬀerential in the growth of
non-diversiﬁable labor income. In this case, the return on domestic equity will increase, relative
to that on foreign equity, when indeed domestic agents receive a bad shock regarding their labor
income. This makes domestic equity a better hedge against labor-income risk relative to foreign
equity and points toward explaining the home bias in equity holdings.
Finally, equation (29) describes the position taken in the foreign bond market and as a
consequence in the domestic bond market, given the overall position implied by (27). When the
covariance between "l;t+1 and the excess return of the foreign bond with respect to the domestic
bond is positive, then foreign bonds do not pay well when needed. In this case the domestic
agent would like to take a short position in the foreign bond market ( F < 0).18
Although simpler versions of (27) and (29) have been treated in the literature, to our knowl-
edge, this is the ﬁrst complete analysis in a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete
markets. Results of the previous literature are nested in the above framework. When there is












F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ re
H;t+1)
vart(^ re
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ re
H;t+1)
: (30)
Covariances are no longer conditional on the other excess returns, but only on the information
set at time–t. There is home bias in equity holdings when home equity is a good hedge with
respect to non-diversiﬁable income risk, i.e. when covt("l;t+1;exrie
t+1) > 0.
A popular argument for international diversiﬁcation being worse is the neoclassical model of
Baxter and Jermann (1997) in which labor income and dividends are correlated. In this case, the
above covariance would be negative, implying even larger holdings of foreign assets. Heathcote
and Perri (2004), instead, show a case in which the correlation can become positive in a model
with capital accumulation and home bias in consumption preferences. Furthermore, Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2009) discuss several theoretical cases that can rationalize a positive covariance
and then imply home-bias in equity.19 In the case of our general-equilibrium model, Section
3 shows that the covariance can be positive or negative depending on the relative strength of
the mark-up shocks. Conditional on a positive mark-up shock, proﬁts and dividends increase,
whereas labor income decreases. This might imply a negative correlation between labor income
and the return on domestic equity. Therefore, the domestic agent would hold more of its own
assets to hedge against labor-income risk.
6 Portfolio Choices under Model Uncertainty
Under rational expectations, agents form expectations trusting the “reference” probability mea-
sure. On the contrary, with model uncertainty, they surround the “reference” probability distri-
18Note that this does not necessarily imply a long position in the domestic bond market. Indeed, the overall
position depends on equation (27), as previously discussed.
19See also Coeurdacier et al. (2007) and Engel and Matsumoto (2006).
12bution with a set of nearby distributions and act according to a distorted probability measure.
In particular, the “subjective” conditional expectations, as shown in (5), are linked to the “refer-
ence” conditional expectations through the martingale increments g and g, for country H and












































This set of equations implies the three restrictions needed to determine the portfolio allocation.








where a superscript R denotes the diﬀerence between the domestic and the foreign variable.
The restriction above shows that the optimal portfolio allocation is going to be aﬀected by the
factor ^ gR
t+1, which measures the cross-country diﬀerence between the subjective distortions and
the approximating probability distribution. We now enrich our set of assumptions to endogenize
the way in which these distortions arise.
We consider the sophisticated agents of the robust-control theory of Hansen and Sargent
(2005, 2007). These agents fear model misspeciﬁcation, and seek decision rules that are robust
to it. Following Hansen and Sargent (2005, 2007), we can regard such robust-decision-making
process as a two-player game between the representative household and an “evil” agent. The
household surrounds the reference model with a set of alternative distributions, in which he/she
believes the true one lies. The “evil” agent will, then, choose the most unfavorable distribution
in this set, and the household will act accordingly. To choose the worst-case distribution, the
“evil” agent seeks to minimize the utility of the decision-maker under an entropy constraint of
the form similar to (6). The latter deﬁnes the size of the set of alternative models, and imposes
a bound on the allowed divergence between the distorted and the approximating measures. In a
















and the restrictions given by the martingale assumption on Gt:
Gt+1 = gt+1Gt (32)
Etgt+1 = 1: (33)
The parameter K in the entropy constraint imposes an upper-bound on the divergence between
the distorted and the approximating beliefs. The higher K, the more afraid of misspeciﬁcation
the agent is, because a higher K allows the “evil” agent to choose larger distortions.
13Hansen and Sargent (2005) propose an alternative formulation of this problem in which the














where  > 0 is a penalty parameter on discounted entropy.
The problem of the “evil” agent becomes that of choosing the path fgtg to minimize (34)
under the constraints (32) and (33). Higher values of  imply less fear of model misspeciﬁcation,
because the “evil” agent is penalized more by raising entropy when minimizing the utility of the
decision-maker. When  goes to inﬁnity, the optimal choice of the “evil” agent is to set gt+1 = 1
at all times, meaning that the optimal distortion is zero: the rational expectations equilibrium
is nested as a special case.
The problem of the decision-maker is instead that of choosing sequences for consumption
and portfolio shares to maximize (34) taking into account the minimizing action of the evil
agent. As discussed in the literature, among others by Barillas et al (2006), it can be shown that
the solution of the inner minimization problem implies a transformation of the original utility










where the parameter  is the following monotonic transformation of :




The equilibrium real stochastic discount factor implied by (35) – evaluated under the reference


































showing that gt+1 can be related to the current and future consumption path. Indeed, in a
ﬁrst-order approximation – which suﬃces to evaluate (31) – we can write:
^ gt+1 =  (   1)
1 X
k=0
k [Et+1^ ct+1+k   Et^ ct+1+k];
20Barillas et al (2006) discuss the relation between fear of model misspeciﬁcation and the class of risk-adjusted
preferences described in Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989). See also Strzalecki (2009) for an
analysis on how models of ambiguity aversion imply diﬀerent preferences for the timing resolution of uncertainty.
Notice also that the framework with model uncertainty is observationally equivalent to a model with preference
shocks (see Pavlova and Rigobon, 2007). Importantly, however, in our context they are endogenous.
14in which ^ gt+1 increases when the agent fears bad news with respect to the consumption-growth
proﬁle. Hence, the worst-case scenario takes the form of downward revisions in current and
future consumption growth.21
Recall that g(st+1jst) is equivalent to the ratio between the “subjective” and “approximating”
probabilities, e (st+1jst)=(st+1jst). Higher values of g(st+1jst) implies that the agent is assigning
a higher probability to those states of nature where there are bad news on the consumption-
growth proﬁle. When g(st+1jst) increases, the appetite for receiving additional wealth increases
as well. In this case, the agent would like to hold assets that pay well when there are indeed bad
news on the consumption-growth proﬁle.
The above derivations apply also to the foreign agent. In the symmetric case in which
 = , we can show that the optimal relative distortion depends negatively on the surprises in
the consumption-growth diﬀerential across countries:
^ gR





t+1+k   Et^ cR
t+1+k













where the second equality substitutes for the relative consumption growth using a ﬁrst-order
approximation of the Euler equations and the budget constraints. Moreover, "q;t+1 is deﬁned as




k [Et+1^ qt+1+k   Et^ qt+1+k]: (38)
With model uncertainty and fears of model misspeciﬁcation, the cross-country diﬀerence in
the appetite for wealth is given by the sum of (23) – capturing the ﬁrst hedging motif described
by the wedge between the marginal utilities of consumption – and (37) – capturing the additional
hedging motif given by the wedge between the subjective distortions. Accordingly, equation (37)
corresponds to equation (2).
The second hedging motif, captured by the variable ^ gR
t+1 and given by the revisions in the
expectation regarding the future path of relative consumption growth, is driven by three sources
of risk: the ﬂuctuations in the excess returns, the labor-income risk and the ﬂuctuations in
the real exchange rate. As argued in Section 2, the coeﬃcients related to excess returns and
labor-income risk are the same for the two hedging motifs: me = ge =  (1   )=sc and
ml = gl =  s=sc. As a consequence, absent real exchange rate risk, the optimal portfolio
allocation driven by ambiguity aversion is the same as the one driven by the benchmark model
with no uncertainty. The degree of ambiguity aversion  is irrelevant in this case.
On the contrary, the coeﬃcient on real exchange rate risk is diﬀerent across the two compo-
nents: mq = 0 while gq =  1. As a consequence, under log-utility, ambiguity aversion implies an
additional term driving the optimal steady-state portfolio shares, compared to equation (26):22










t Et(exrt+1  "q;t+1); (39)
which depends on the covariances between the excess returns and the surprises in the real ex-
change rate, and on the degree of ambiguity aversion. The higher  is, the more averse to model
21Hansen et al. (2008) show how to derive gt+1 as a closed-form solution including risk-premia terms, which,
however, are not important in our approximation for computing the steady-state portfolio shares.
22Refer to the Appendix for details.
15uncertainty the investors are, the more important this additional component is. When investors
are not concerned about model uncertainty (i.e. as  ! 1) then  is equal to 1: beliefs are not
distorted and (39) coincides with (26).








































On top of equation (28), agents would like to hold more domestic equities if their return is
high when the real exchange rate is expected to appreciate. This requires that "q;t+1 co-varies
positively with the excess returns on foreign-versus-domestic equity, ^ re
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ re
H;t+1,
conditional on the other excess returns. As the fear of model misspeciﬁcation increases, then,
this additional hedging motif matters more for determining home bias in international portfolio
choice.
There is an important distinction to underline at this point. As anticipated in Section 2, the
additional component in equation (39), capturing the hedge against real exchange rate risk, would
also be present in a standard model with non-distorted beliefs and non-unitary risk aversion, as







mq =    1;
with  measuring the degree of risk aversion, and ^ gR
t+1 = 0 at all times. Hence, the second
component in equation (39), with  substituting for , would also apply, but for a completely
diﬀerent reason. What would matter is the impact of the real exchange rate in driving apart the
real marginal utilities of consumption across the two countries. Agents would like to trade assets
to hedge these diﬀerences, but not under log utility.23 In our model, instead, ﬂuctuations in the
real exchange rate aﬀect the optimal portfolio allocation because of the distortions in the beliefs
(hedging motif (2)), which is relevant even under log-utility.
Moreover, in the standard case,  would represent the risk-aversion coeﬃcient and, at the
same time, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. By raising risk aversion, to
make the second component larger, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution would be lowered
and the implied risk-free rate would increase in a counterfactual way. In our model, instead, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is tied to one (a value close to recent empirical estimates,
as discussed in Vissing-Jœrgensen and Attanasio, 2003) whereas the parameter  – now capturing
the degree of ambiguity aversion – can be larger than one, thus increasing the importance of
the second component without aﬀecting the mean of the risk-free rate, as shown in Barillas et
al (2006).
Furthermore, equation (38) shows that what matters is not only the risk of an immediate
variation in the real exchange rate, but also the risk of future ones. As  gets close to one,
only the long-run risk remains relevant. In this case, indeed, "q;t+1 becomes proportional to the
revisions in the conditional expectations of the long-run real exchange rate:
"q;t+1  = Et+1^ q1   Et^ q1:
23Under log-utility, indeed, substitution and income eﬀects cancel each other out and relative-inﬂation risk does
not imply diﬀerences in the marginal utility of consumption across countries once evaluated in the same units of
consumption goods.
16This is a further novel implication of our model. Indeed, the existing literature that analyzes
the hedging motifs underlying portfolio choices in international macro models, by building on
static frameworks, necessarily focuses only on short-run real exchange rate risk. In the next
Section we will show that the diﬀerence between short- and long-run real exchange rate risk can
be empirically relevant when evaluating the implications for international portfolio allocation.
7 Empirical Evidence
One of the appealing features of the theoretical model presented in the previous section is that
it derives clear implications about the second moments of variables that are directly observ-
able. These implications can therefore be tested empirically without further assumptions on the
empirical counterparts of our theoretical variables.
7.1 Data
To evaluate the implications of equations (26) and (39), we collect and use quarterly data for the
G7 Countries, over the sample 1980q1-2007q4. We consider the US as the Home country and
the aggregation of the remaining G7 countries as the Foreign country.24






in which Pi;t is the CPI in local currency for country i, Si;t is the bilateral nominal exchange
rate between the local currency in country i and the dollar (US dollars for one unit of local






Accordingly, the real exchange rate between the US and the G6 countries is simply computed as:












where Pt is the CPI index for the US.







24In particular, we use data on aggregate nominal compensation of employees, from the OECD Quarterly
National Accounts (**OCOS02B, where ** is the two-letter country code), the Consumer Price Indexes from
the IFS database (**I64..F), nominal returns on short-term treasury bills from the IFS database (**I60C..),
nominal National Price and Gross Return indexes on the domestic stock market, from MSCI Barra (MS****L), in
local currency, and bilateral nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the USD, constructed using the domestic stock-price
indexes in USD, from the MSCI Barra (MS****$). Moving from the monthly National Price and Gross Return




25To check for robustness, we repeated the analysis using average GDP-weights as an alternative aggregation
methodology, as in Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009), and using both aggregate and per-capita levels for the
quantity variables. None of our results is signiﬁcantly aﬀected.
17Table 1: Some Data Statistics (Annual rates)
() () () (;^ 
R
  ^ q) (;^ q)
^ 
R
  ^ q 0:773 13.051 0.024 1.000  0:438
^ q 0.165 11.348 0.175  0:438 1.000
^ re
F + ^ q   ^ re
H 0.699 13.535 0.108  0:530 0.436
^ r
F + ^ q   ^ rH 0.984 10.718 0.030  0:919 0.722
^ re
H   ^ rH 6.350 15.850  0:004  0:027  0:139
Note: means and standard deviations are in percentage points
in which we measure Wi;t li;t using data on aggregate nominal compensation of employees in
country i. Accordingly, relative labor income in units of US dollars is the log diﬀerence between





























t   ^ qt:
Given nominal quarterly returns on the stock market, deﬁned by Re
i;t for each country i and
Re
t for the US, and nominal quarterly returns on bonds, deﬁned by Ri;t for each country i and
Rt for the US, we can obtain the real returns as ri;t  Ri;tPi;t 1=Pi;t and re
i;t  Re
i;tPi;t 1=Pi;t for
each country i and for the US. Using those, we construct the three excess returns of interest as:
exrde
t  ^ re







t  ^ re











t  ^ r








Table 1 reports some summary statistics for the variables of interest. We report the average
level () and the standard deviation (), both annualized and in percentage points, the serial
correlation coeﬃcient () and the correlation with the growth rate in relative labor income
(;^ 
R
 ^ q) and in the real exchange rate (;^ q). These simple correlations already suggest
that domestic equity seems a poor hedge against labor income risk, relative to foreign stocks,
while both domestic equity and domestic bonds seem somewhat useful in providing the right
co-movement to hedge against real exchange rate ﬂuctuations. In the next sections we will reﬁne
and articulate these results.
In order to evaluate the optimal portfolio allocation implied by our model, we need to calibrate
the steady-state consumption-to-ﬁnancial wealth ratio, sc. To this end, we use the average
ﬁnancial wealth-to-disposable income ratio for the US computed by Bertaut (2002), and the
average consumption-to-disposable income ratio for the US, computed using data on personal
consumption of non-durable goods and personal disposable income. The former, on a quarterly
frequency, amounts to about 20, while the latter to around .3: by using these numbers we get
a calibrated consumption-to-wealth ratio sc = :3=20 = :015. We calibrate the quarterly time
discount factor following Tallarini (2000) and Barillas et al (2006):  = :995. Using the value
of sc obtained above, we derive the model-consistent steady-state value of the labor income-to-
ﬁnancial wealth ratio, by using s = sc   (1   )= = :01.
187.2 The statistical model
We deﬁne the data vector yt 
h
^ t; ^ 

t; ^ qt; exrde
t ; exrie
t ; exrib




yt =  + Ayt 1 + et; (41)
in which et is distributed as a multivariate normal with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix

:26 In the data vector y we also include a series of additional controls, collected into the vector
x, which might be useful in describing the dynamic path of the variables of interest. In practice,
x includes the growth rate of relative GDP, the slope of the US yield curve, the international
excess return on ten-year government bonds and the growth rate in the US trade balance.27
Using the above, we can evaluate the theoretical implications of our framework, and relate the
results to existing literature.28
7.3 Asset structure
In our empirical analysis, we study three alternative cases concerning the asset structure. The
ﬁrst case assumes that the only asset available for international trade is equity (henceforth Asset
Menu I) as in Baxter and Jermann (1997). In the second case we allow for trade in both
equity and bonds, but restrict the latter to an overall balanced position (Asset Menu II), as
in van Wincoop and Warnock (2006, 2008) and Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009); in this
case, therefore, a long position on domestic bonds necessarily implies a short position of equal
magnitude on foreign ones. Finally, we introduce a third asset structure, which is the general
case in which bonds and equity are both available, and leveraged positions between risky and
riskless assets are also allowed for (Asset Menu III); as a consequence, in this case the relative
positions in home and foreign bonds are not directly related.
7.4 The role of labor-income risk
In this section we evaluate whether labor-income risk can explain the home-bias puzzle in equity
holdings. In particular, this is the ﬁrst component in equation (39) and depends on the positive
covariance between the present discounted value of domestic-versus-foreign labor income and the
excess return of foreign-versus-domestic equity. This hedging motif, which arises even under no
model uncertainty, has been emphasized by several studies without reaching a clear consensus.
Baxter and Jermann (1997) show that when equity is the only asset that can be traded interna-
tionally, the presence of non-diversiﬁable income risk actually implies a foreign-equity bias. On
the other hand, Bottazzi et al. (1996) and more recently Julliard (2003) and Coeurdacier and
Gourinchas (2009) bring evidence supporting the view that hedging against labor-income risk
26The length of the VAR is chosen optimally using the Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion for each estimation, and
turns out to be always 1.
27Gourinchas and Rey (2007) show that the net-export growth rate is a useful predictor for portfolio returns at
long horizons, while the other variables are among the forecasting variables commonly used for predicting asset
returns and labor income. See also Campbell (1996).
28For what concerns the statistical model, as a robustness check, we estimated three alternative speciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is the minimal requirement to describe the model economy and include only data on labor
income and the excess return on foreign equity. The second and third speciﬁcations augment the ﬁrst one by
introducing data on the residual excess returns. Moreover, for each of the speciﬁcations above, we also varied the
informational content of the data-vector by adding the real exchange rate, in changes, and the auxiliary regressors
included in vector x. In the text we report results for the extensive speciﬁcation only, since results are robust to
the other alternatives. The full set of results is available upon request.
19Table 2: The empirical role of Labor-Income Risk
Asset Menu I Asset Menu II Asset Menu III
Conditional covariance-to-variance ratios of LIR with selected excess returns
^ re
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ re
H;t+1c  0.524 0.016 0:040
^ r
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ rH;t+1c —  1.116  1:129
^ re
F;t+1   ^ rH;t+1c — — 0:062
Optimal Portfolio Allocation under Rational Expectations
 e
F 1.020 0.484 0.460
 e
H  0.020 0.516 0:479
 F — 1.108 1.121
 e
H +  e
F 1.000 1.000 0.939
 H +  F — 0.000 0.061
 e
F +  F 1.020 1.592 1.580
Note: LIR denotes Labor-Income Risk; Asset Menu I: equities only; Asset Menu II: equities and balanced bonds; Asset Menu III:
general model with equities and bonds.  e
F denotes the share of wealth invested in foreign equity;  e
H denotes the share of wealth invested
in domestic equity;  F denotes the share of wealth invested in foreign bonds;  e
H +  e
F measures the overall share of wealth invested in
equity assets;  H +  F measures the overall share of wealth invested in debt instruments;  e
F +  F measures the overall share of wealth
invested in foreign assets.
can explain some degree of home-bias in equity holdings. Heathcote and Perri (2004) and Coeur-
dacier and Gourinchas (2009), moreover, discuss some theoretical examples that can produce the
required co-movements to explain home-bias.
We analyze this interaction in the context of our dynamic model. Using the output of
the VAR, we construct the surprises in the path of relative labor income across countries, and
compute the time-t conditional moments that we need. For comparisons with existing literature,
however, we also compute the unconditional covariance-to-variance ratios, obtained through
straightforward OLS projection of the surprises in relative labor income on the excess returns of
the assets available for trade.29 In the simple case of Asset Menu I (only equities) we obtain:
"l;t+1 =  0:479  (^ re
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ re
H;t+1) + ul;t+1;
(0:081)
where the standard error is reported in parenthesis. The unconditional covariance-to-variance
ratio therefore is negative, statistically signiﬁcant and economically rather large. The implication
is that hedging labor-income risk does not produce home-bias in equity, but rather implies a
foreign-equity bias. This result on the one hand supports Baxter and Jermann (1997), and on
the other hand weakens the argument of Heathcote and Perri (2007).
In Table 2 we report the time-t conditional covariance-to-variance ratios related to labor-
income risk, and the portfolio allocation implied by our theoretical model under the assumption
that there is no real exchange rate risk. These results, moreover, are consistent with the bench-
mark case of no model uncertainty. In particular, the second column of Table 2 shows that
the ﬁnding of Baxter and Jermann (1997), i.e. that the portfolio diversiﬁcation puzzle is even
worse than expected, is conﬁrmed even when we move to the evaluation of the time-t conditional
moments, consistently with equation (30).
This result has recently been challenged by Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009), who point
out that, once also riskless bonds are traded, variances and covariances should be computed
29The unconditional covariance-to-variance ratios would be appropriate in our case if the process yt were in
fact a multivariate white noise. Our data, however, do not support this representation.
20Table 3: Unconditional covariance-variance ratios
Loadings of: Coeurdacier–Gourinchas (2009)* Benigno–Nisticò (2009)**
^ re




F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ rH;t+1  1:170  0:982
(0.110) (0.084)
Note: standard errors in parentheses. * Dependent variable is ^ rw
t+1   Et^ rw
t+1. ** Dependent variable is "l;t+1.
conditional on the other asset returns. Their claim is that, with the appropriate conditioning,
the previous result would be overturned, and their empirical ﬁndings indeed support this claim.
We repeat their analysis of Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009) within our dynamic frame-
work, where the asset structure assumed therein corresponds to our Asset Menu II. Speciﬁcally,
Table 3 reports the result of an OLS projection of labor-income risk on the two relevant ex-
cess returns, and contrasts our ﬁndings with theirs.30 In the second column we report the
ﬁndings of Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009) which show that, conditioning on the excess re-
turn on foreign-versus-domestic bonds, there is a positive covariance between the excess return on
foreign-versus-domestic equity and non-diversiﬁable labor-income risk, whereas the unconditional
covariance is instead negative. They conclude that the results of Baxter and Jermann (1997) are
driven by their particular asset structure, and do not hold when bonds are included. In the third
column, we report our estimation’s results, which show instead a negative (though insigniﬁcant)
conditional covariance-to-variance ratio.
The diﬀerence between the two results can be explained by the diﬀerent approach to mea-
suring labor-income risk. Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009) use the unexpected component of
the (home relative to foreign) return-to-labor, which they construct as
^ rw




k(Et+1   Et)(^ 
R




k(Et+1   Et)(^ re
H;t+1+k   ^ qt+1+k   ^ re
F;t+1+k); (42)
where   1   sc is a constant of linearization that depends on the average consumption-to-
wealth ratio. It is worth noticing that this measure is not directly implied by their model,
which is static, but rather it is borrowed from Campbell (1996). Two important assumptions
underlie this formulation, which are critical to distinguish their approach from ours. First, it
is assumed that there exists a market for domestically tradeable claims on the stream of future
labor-income ﬂows, which implies that the return on labor is computed in analogy to the return
on the ﬁnancial assets, using the log-linear approximation of Campbell and Shiller (1988).31
Second, the expected relative return on domestic non-ﬁnancial wealth is equated to the expected
excess return on domestic-versus-foreign equities. This is a strong assumption, as also discussed
by Campbell (1996), and explains why the ﬁrst term on the second line of equation (42) arises.
With this deﬁnition, it follows that the return-to-labor is likely to be positively related, by
construction, with the excess return on foreign-versus-domestic equity.
30Note that we have deﬁned the excess returns as foreign-versus-domestic returns, the opposite of Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2009). Accordingly, for comparison, in Table 3 we report their results multiplied by -1.
31Furthermore, it seems odd to assume that there are tradeable claims on human capital which are traded
domestically and not internationally.
21We do not make either of the assumptions above. Instead, in our framework, the relevant
measure of non-diversiﬁable labor risk is directly implied by the theoretical model, and corre-
sponds to the revision in the present-discounted value of cross-country labor income "l;t+1, as
shown by equation (25).32 It is worth noticing that our measure of labor-income risk is instead
similar to those used by Shiller (1995) and Baxter and Jermann (1997), which coincide with the
ﬁrst summation on the right-hand-side of (42).33 Using this deﬁnition, we ﬁnd that domestic
equity is not a good hedge, reinforcing Baxter and Jermann’s (1997) result even if we condition
on bond returns.
To derive the equilibrium portfolio allocations implied by our theoretical model, we compute
the relevant covariance-to-variance ratios conditioning them also on the information set available
at time t, and report the results in the second column of Table 2. The covariance between labor-
income risk and the excess return on equities becomes of the right sign, but it is quantitatively
negligible, and it does not imply a substantial degree of home-bias. On this respect, therefore, our
results again contrast with Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009). However, we share the ﬁnding
that agents should go long in foreign bonds and short in domestic ones, with the counterfactual
implication that almost 160% of domestic wealth is allocated to foreign assets.
The third column of Table 2 displays the results for Asset Menu III, and shows that allowing
for leveraged positions between equity and riskless assets does not change the results. Indeed,
the covariance of labor-income risk with the domestic equity premium is positive, implying an
overall long position in the international bond market ( e
H +  e
F < 1). This further exacerbates
the inability of labor-income risk alone to support home-bias in equity: even though less than
half of the steady-state wealth is allocated to foreign equities, the share allocated to domestic
ones is also smaller than 50%.
7.5 The role of real exchange rate risk
In the above section we showed that there is no support for the view that domestic equity is
a good hedge against non-diversiﬁable labor-income risk to explain the home-bias in US equity
holdings. We now move to analyze the portfolio implications of model uncertainty where the
fear of model misspeciﬁcation translates into long-run real exchange rate risk.
The role of hedging real exchange rate ﬂuctuations as an explanation for the home-bias puzzle
has been recently questioned by van Wincoop and Warnock (2006, 2008) and Coeurdacier and
Gourinchas (2009). Their main argument is based on the evidence that the covariance between
real exchange rate changes and the excess return on foreign-versus-domestic equity becomes
negligible once this covariance is taken conditional on other returns, like the excess return on
riskless bonds. This observation comes from the results of a simple OLS regression between
one-period ahead changes in the real exchange rate and the vector of excess returns
^ qt+1 = q +  0
qexrt+1 + uq;t+1; (43)
reported in Table 4. While the loading of the excess returns on foreign equity is signiﬁcant and
positive if equity is the only tradeable asset, once the vector of excess returns is augmented to
include also the excess return on foreign-versus-domestic bonds, the covariance-to-variance ratio
between the real exchange rate and the excess return on equity becomes negligible.
32Note that in a ﬁrst-order approximation (which is all is needed to evaluate the orthogonality conditions and
derive the portfolio allocation) expected excess returns are always zero, so the last terms in (42) would drop even
if we did make the two assumptions discussed above.
33Indeed, the only diﬀerence between (25) and the measure in Shiller (1995) and Baxter and Jermann (1997)
is the discount parameter: while they use   1   sc, we use the time discount factor . Numerically, however,
they are also very close to each other.
22Table 4: Loadings of excess returns on real exchange rate depreciations
Loadings of: Asset Menu I Asset Menu II Asset Menu III
^ re
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ re
H;t+1 0:365 0:021  0:026
(0.072) (0.068) (0.071)
^ r
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ rH;t+1 – 0:747 0:781
– (0.086) (0.086)
^ re
H;t+1   ^ rH;t+1 – –  0:098
– – (0.048)
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is ^ qt+1.
In a rational-expectation model such small covariances (provided they are of the right sign)
would require an unreasonably large degree of risk aversion to justify the hedging role of domestic
equities, which would then open room for other puzzles, like the aforementioned risk-free rate
puzzle.
Instead, our dynamic model with distorted beliefs gives a new role to real exchange rate risk:
what matters is not only the current real-exchange-rate risk but also the revisions in the entire
future expected path of the real exchange rate. What is relevant, therefore, is not so much the
role of equity to hedge against short-run real exchange rate risk, but rather its hedging properties
against long-run ﬂuctuations.
To study whether shifting from a short-run to a long-run perspective aﬀects the hedging
properties of equity with respect to real exchange rate risk, we start writing equation (38) in




k [Et+1^ qt+1+k   Et^ qt+1+k] = (1   )
1 X
k=0
k [Et+1^ qt+1+k   Et^ qt+1+k]: (44)
By looking at diﬀerent terms in the summation above, we can investigate the co-movement
between asset returns and surprises in the real exchange rate path, at diﬀerent time horizons.



































Figure 1: The covariance-to-variance ratio between Et+1^ qt+1+k and exrie
t+1, for increasing k (horizontal
axis). Asset Menu I: equities only. Asset Menu II: equities and balanced bonds. Asset Menu III: general
model with equities and bonds.
























Figure 2: The covariance-to-variance ratio between Et+1^ qt+1+k and exrib
t+1, for increasing k (horizontal
axis). Asset Menu II: equities and balanced bonds. Asset Menu III: general model with equities and bonds.
the risk to be hedged is farther away in the future, as opposed to very soon.
To this end, given our estimated model (41), we compute the time t + 1 news about the
real exchange rate k periods ahead, given by Et+1^ qt+1+k, in which Et+1()  Et+1() Et()
denotes the time-t+1 revisions in conditional expectations, and in particular the news about the
long-run component Et+1^ q1. Moreover, for each time-horizon we also evaluate the covariance-
to-variance ratios with respect to all excess returns of interest, conditional on time-t information
and on the residual asset space, given by  1
t Et(Et+1^ qt+1+k  exrt+1). Hence, Figure 1 plots
the covariance-to-variance ratios of the news in the real exchange rate path with the excess return
on foreign-versus-domestic equity, against the time-horizon k, for the three asset structures that
we consider. Figure 2 does the same for the excess return on foreign-versus-domestic bonds, for
the two asset menus which include bonds (II and III).
The ﬁrst point in each plot, i.e. when k = 0, corresponds to the covariance-to-variance
ratio of a static model, in which only the short-run risk matters. Moving from the left to the
right panel of Figure 1, the ﬁrst point drops from about .4 to virtually zero, implying that the
hedging power of equity against real exchange rate risk fades away, when we condition on other
excess returns and in particular on bonds. This is the core of the results in van Wincoop and
Warnock (2006) and Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009).
However, at longer horizons the hedging properties of equity sharply improve, even when we
condition on other excess returns. Figure 2, instead, shows that the hedging properties of bonds
are only marginally aﬀected. We view this evidence as suggesting that domestic equity can have
a relatively more important role in hedging the real exchange rate risk at longer horizons in order
to explain the international home-bias puzzle.34
7.6 The role of model uncertainty
We now merge the results and discussions of the previous sections and present the empirical
implications of our framework through equation (39).
Table 5 reports the covariance-to-variance ratios of the two sources of risk implied by our
model (labor-income and real exchange rate) with the relevant excess returns, for the three asset
34A recent literature documents the quantitatively substantial implications of long-run risk for asset valuation,
in the context of non-expected utility frameworks. See, among others, Hansen et al. (2008), who also provide an
interpretation related to model uncertainty.
24menus that we consider. In particular, the empirical co-movements with respect to the interna-
tional excess return on equity reveals that domestic equity – relative to foreign – is qualitatively
useful to hedge both risks, as long as riskless bonds are available for trade;35 however, they also
imply that the role of domestic equity as a hedge against real exchange rate risk is at least twice
as important as its role to hedge against labor-income risk (almost ten times more important
under Asset Menu II). Co-movements with exrib imply that domestic bonds – relative to foreign
– represent always a useful hedge against real exchange rate risk (positive ratio), but a bad hedge
against labor-income risk (negative ratio). In the general case of Asset Menu III, moreover, the
top-panel of Table 5 implies that debt instruments are a relatively better hedge against labor-
income risk (positive ratio), while equity assets are relatively better to hedge real exchange rate
risk (negative ratio).
Table 5: The empirical role of Real Exchange Rate Risk
Asset Menu I Asset Menu II Asset Menu III
Conditional covariance-to-variance ratios of LIR with selected excess returns
^ re
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ re
H;t+1  0.524 0.016 0:040
^ r
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ rH;t+1 —  1.116  1:129
^ re
F;t+1   ^ rH;t+1 — — 0:062
Conditional covariance-to-variance ratios of RERR with selected excess returns
^ re
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ re
H;t+1 0.518 0.145 0:098
^ r
F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ rH;t+1 — 0.771 0:796
^ re
F;t+1   ^ rH;t+1 — —  0.117
Note: LIR denotes Labor-Income Risk; RERR denotes Real Exchange Rate Risk; Asset Menu I: equities only; Asset Menu II: equities
and balanced bonds; Asset Menu III: general model with equities and bonds.
Figure 3 shows the implications of these empirical co-movements for the optimal portfolio
allocation, for increasing degrees of ambiguity aversion and for the three asset menus considered.
In particular, the ﬁrst point of each line captures the case of no-model uncertainty ( = 1) in
which the optimal portfolio allocation is driven only by labor-income risk – the ﬁrst component of
the right-hand-side of (39). As the degree of ambiguity aversion  increases, instead, the second
component of (39), related to real exchange rate risk, becomes progressively more important.
The top-left panel of Figure 3 displays the share of wealth allocated to domestic equity ( e
H).
As the degree of ambiguity aversion rises,  e
H sharply increases, regardless of the speciﬁc asset
structure (up to 70% for Asset Menus I and II and up to 80% for Asset Menu III). In particular,
in the general case of Asset Menu III, when  = 10 the share of wealth allocated to domestic
equity reaches about 77%, explaining therefore a large proportion of the home-bias found in the
data, and in contrast with the 48% of the case with no model uncertainty. The top-right panel
shows the overall share of wealth that the domestic agent invests in the equity market. Asset
Menu III is the only case in which leveraged positions between diﬀerent kinds of securities are
allowed for. Indeed, as the degree of ambiguity aversion increases, the domestic agent takes a
short position in the overall bond portfolio to invest more in equities: the component driven
by hedging real exchange rate risk in (39) dominates, and implies that domestic equities pay
relatively better than domestic bonds precisely when an unexpected appreciation of the real
exchange rate occurs. In particular, for  = 10, the overall share of wealth allocated to equity
35Indeed, in the case of Asset Menu I, domestic equity are a better hedge against real exchange rate risk
(positive ratio) and a worse hedge against labor-income risk (negative ratio), relative to foreign equity.
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Figure 3: Optimal portfolio allocation: the eﬀect of increasing degrees of concern about model misspec-
iﬁcation. Asset Menu I: equities only. Asset Menu II: equities and balanced bonds. Asset Menu III:
general model with equities and bonds.
( e
H+ e
F) increases to about 110%. This leveraged position in favor of equity assets also explains
why the optimal degree of home-bias in the case of Asset Menu III is larger than in the other two
cases. The bottom-left panel of Figure 3 shows the share invested in foreign bonds. When  = 1,
foreign bonds are a good hedge against labor-income risk (relative to domestic bonds), and the
agent invests virtually all of his/her wealth in foreign bonds: this implication is counterfactual.
Instead, foreign bonds are not a good hedge with respect to long-run real exchange rate risk and
indeed agents would like to take a short position in this respect. As  increases, therefore, the
bad-hedge component with respect to real exchange rate risk becomes more important, and the
share of wealth allocated to foreign bonds decrease to about 5% when  = 10.
The bottom-right panel of Figure 3 shows the overall share invested in foreign assets. When
 = 1, there is a large foreign bias in asset holdings (mainly bonds) which is ﬁnanced by short-
ening the domestic bond: foreign bonds are, indeed, a good hedge with respect to labor-income
risk, as previously discussed. Both foreign bonds and equity are, however, a bad hedge with
respect to long-run real exchange rate risk; accordingly, when  rises, the overall wealth invested
in foreign assets decreases substantially (38% when  = 10, in the case of Asset Menu III).
Moreover, in the general case of Asset Menu III, we can evaluate the ability of the model to
replicate other stylized facts that are receiving increasing attention by the empirical literature.
Tille (2005, 2008), for example, reports a detailed breakdown of the composition of US foreign
assets and liabilities, and documents four basic features: 1) the US is a large net creditor in
equity instruments and 2) a net debtor in bond instruments; 3) the net position on foreign-
currency bonds is about balanced, while 4) the position in bonds denominated in US dollars
is largely negative. In our framework, the net-foreign asset position in equities is given by
NFE =  e
F +  e
H   1 and the one in bonds by NFB =  F +  H, in which  F and  H capture
country H’s position on bonds denominated in foreign and domestic currency, respectively.36
36Indeed, the steady-state net-foreign asset position (as a share of steady-state domestic wealth) is given by
26As shown by the ﬁrst points in Figure 3, labor-income risk alone is not useful along this
dimension: the ﬁrst component, indeed, implies an overall long position in the international
bond market, making the US a net debtor in equity assets ( e
H +  e
F < 1), and a largely long
position on foreign-currency bonds ( F ' 1:1). On the contrary, real exchange rate risk and
fear of model misspeciﬁcation are able to reconcile the model with all the stylized facts on US
cross-border holdings documented by Tille (2005, 2008). Indeed, rising degrees of ambiguity
aversion imply a creditor position in equity assets ( e
H +  e
F > 1) and a debtor position in debt
instruments ( H +  F < 0) – top-right panel. Moreover, the position in foreign-currency bonds
shrinks progressively towards a balanced position ( F ' 0), while the one in home-currency
bonds remains negative ( H < 0).
7.7 Calibrating  using detection error probabilities
This section describes how to appropriately calibrate  as a parameter capturing the concern
about model misspeciﬁcation. We follow Anderson et al. (2003) and Hansen and Sargent (2007)
in using detection error probabilities. Let us call model A the approximating model and model
B() the worst-case model associated with a particular . Agents start with the belief that
the models are equally likely. That is, they assign 50% prior probability to each model. After
having seen T observations, they can perform a likelihood ratio test for distinguishing the two
models. Under the hypothesis that model A is correct, we denote with pA() the probability that
a likelihood ratio test would instead falsely say that model B() generated the data. Conversely,
we denote with pB() the probability that a likelihood ratio test would falsely say that model A
generated the data, when in fact model B() is correct. The detection error probability, then, is








The detection error probability is a decreasing function of , since a larger  (and therefore a
smaller ) implies a lower penalization upon relaxing the entropy constraint in equation (34).
Indeed, the higher  the wider is the entropy ball inside which the consumer allows the evil
agent to choose the worst-case distortion, and therefore the more afraid of misspeciﬁcation the
consumer is. Accordingly, higher values of  imply a larger divergence between the worst-case
model and the approximating one, and is therefore less probable that the likelihood-ratio test
will favor the wrong model. When  = 1, on the contrary, the two models are equivalent and
p() is therefore equal to 1=2.
It is important to notice that the mapping between  and p(), is model-speciﬁc and varies in
diﬀerent contexts. This is why the plausibility of a given value of , as a measure of the concern
about model misspeciﬁcation, should be appropriately determined in terms of the detection error
probability that it implies, which can instead be regarded as a context-invariant measure.
In our context the approximating model is given by the VAR in (41):
yt =  + Ayt 1 + et
where et is distributed as a multivariate normal with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix

. In the Appendix we show that the worst-case models, associated with speciﬁc values of 
and , imply a distortion in the mean of the VAR, and take the form
yt =  + w() + Ayt 1 + et (45)
NFA   
e








H and NFB   F   

H. The equations
in the text use the properties of the symmetric steady state in which  a =  q a
:  
e
H = 1    
e
H and  

H =   H.
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DEP versus discounted relative entropy
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Figure 4: Detection Error Probabilities (DEP) versus fear of model misspeciﬁcation ( and , left
panel) and versus discounted conditional relative entropy ( and , right panel).
for consumers in country H and
yt =  + w() + Ayt 1 + et (46)
for those in country F, where w() and w() are the optimal distortions in the mean.
We simulated 100,000 samples, each of size 112 observations (corresponding to the sample
1980q1-2007q4 that we use in the VAR estimation), and computed the detection error probabil-
ities associated with the approximating and the worst-case models, by varying the parameters 
and . The results are displayed in Figure 4.
The left panel of Figure 4 shows the detection error probabilities, p() and p(), plotted
against  and . We follow Anderson et al. (2003), Maenhout (2006) and Barillas et al. (2006),
and consider alternative models whose detection error probabilities are around 10 per cent as
“diﬃcult to detect”. Figure 3 has shown that values of  or  between 5 and 10 are suﬃcient
to get the most of the model ﬁt in terms of home-bias in equity and other empirical evidence on
cross-border holdings. Figure 4 then shows that values of  and  between 7 and 10 are still
associated with detection error probabilities around 0.10.
The degree of ambiguity aversion needed to explain the empirical facts is therefore consis-
tent with conservative values of the detection error probabilities, thus validating the empirical
relevance of the model’s implications. Given that the left panel shows that for similar detection
error probability  and  are very close, we can also conclude that the assumption  =  is
generally innocuous.37
The right panel of Figure 4 plots the detection error probabilities against the discounted






37At the threshold value of 10%, the values for  and 
 are, respectively, 9 and 7.5.






for those in country F. This panel reveals that for each value of detection error probability,
the discounted entropies are the same for the two agents, in further support of the view that a
bound on detection error probabilities, rather than a given value for , appropriately deﬁnes a
context-invariant measure of concern about model uncertainty.
8 Conclusions
The observation that international investors hold a disproportionate share of their wealth in
domestic rather than foreign assets is one of the most persistent fact in international ﬁnance.
This is named the international home-bias puzzle, that the literature has been dealing with for
a couple of decades.
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of portfolio and consumption
choices, with incomplete markets and distorted beliefs. Households might use a “subjective”
probability distribution that is generally diﬀerent from the “approximating” one and make robust
optimal choices against model uncertainty. This framework assigns a new role to real exchange
rate risk for portfolio allocation even in a model with log utility. Importantly, moreover, what
matters is not only the short-run risk but also and foremost the long-run risk of real exchange
rate ﬂuctuations.
Within this framework we characterize optimal portfolio allocations in terms of covariances
between measurable sources of risk to be hedged (non-diversiﬁable labor-income risk and real
exchange rate risk) and a vector of cross-country excess returns, and evaluate their empirical
relevance using ﬁnancial and macro data on the G7 countries.
Our results suggest that, contrary to what claimed in recent related contributions, hedging
non-diversiﬁable labor-income risk is not suﬃcient to account for the lack of international port-
folio diversiﬁcation. Indeed, in a setting in which equity is the only available asset, correlations
in ﬁnancial data support a large foreign-equity bias, as in Baxter and Jermann (1997). Adding
further assets does not help in identifying a clear role for this risk in explaining the home-bias
puzzle, once the former is measured in a model-consistent way. On the other hand, a “plau-
sible” concern about model misspeciﬁcation is able to generate a substantial equilibrium home
bias in equity holdings, and allows to match other empirical facts regarding the US cross-border
holdings. We evaluate the “plausibility” of the concern for model uncertainty by resorting to
detection error probabilities, which measure how easily the competing models can be told apart
using a ﬁnite amount of data.
The methodological contribution of the paper goes beyond the analysis of the home-bias puz-
zle. The class of preferences that we suggest, in fact, produces a perturbation of the equilibrium
stochastic discount factor which decouples the attitudes towards intertemporal substitution with
those towards risk and ambiguity, and can prove useful in addressing other failures of standard
preference speciﬁcations along the asset-price dimension.38 Indeed, it has been shown, in closed-
economy settings, that disentangling the elasticity of intertemporal substitution from the degree
of risk aversion helps in accounting for the equity premium puzzle. Once we open the economy
to international trade in assets, there are additional puzzling features of ﬁnancial data, among
which the international equity- and bond-premia puzzles and the Backus-Smith anomaly are
38See for a discussion Backus et al. (2004).
29notable examples.39 All these stylized facts imply restrictions on the stochastic discount factor
that standard preferences cannot meet at the same time, and that might be all reconnected to
some common misspeciﬁcation.40 The modiﬁcation of the stochastic discount factor that our
preference speciﬁcation implies is a promising tool to correct this misspeciﬁcation and build
macro models whose predictions are closer to the empirical implications of ﬁnancial data.
39Barillas et al. (2006) discusses the implications of model uncertainty for the equity premium puzzle; Piazzesi
and Schneider (2006) studies the slope of the yield curve with Epstein-Zin preferences. Ilut (2008) studies how
ambiguity aversion can help explain the uncovered-interest-rate puzzle.
40All excess-return puzzles, for example, imply “high” lower bounds on the volatility of the equilibrium stochastic
discount factor, as discussed for the equity premium by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991).
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34Appendix
A Some Useful Deﬁnitions
.
To get equation (10), we have deﬁned

















































































B Derivation of equation (26)
In what follows, a variable with an “upper-bar” denotes the symmetric steady state and a “hat” denotes the log-
deviation with respect to such steady state. A ﬁrst-order approximation of the Euler conditions (12) and (14)
implies
Et^ ct+1 = Et^ rp;t+1; (B.1)
Et^ c

t+1 = Et^ r

p;t+1: (B.2)
In particular, the portfolio returns can be approximated to ﬁrst order as
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In a ﬁrst-order approximation, the no-arbitrage conditions imply that excess returns have zero conditional
means, Etexrt+1 = 0. It follows, using equations (B.1) and (B.2), that the cross-country diﬀerential in the
expected consumption growth depends on the expected depreciation in the real exchange rate
Et^ c
R
t+1 = Et^ qt+1; (B.4)
where an upper-script R denotes the diﬀerence between the domestic and foreign variables.




t = ^ a
R
t 1 +  
0exrt + ^ qt + s^ 
R
t   sc^ c
R
t ; (B.5)
where s is the steady-state ratio between non-traded income and ﬁnancial wealth, given by s   = a, which is
equal in the two countries; sc is the steady-state ratio between consumption and ﬁnancial wealth and such that















The set of diﬀerence equations (B.4) and (B.5) can be solved forward to obtain relative consumption and




t ) as a function of the states (
R
t 1, ^ qt 1) and the processes of excess returns, relative non-
diversiﬁable income and the real exchange rate fexrt, ^ 
R
t , ^ qt}. In particular, we obtain
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T   ^ qT): (B.8)
We determine the portfolio shares by using a second-order approximation of the moment conditions (20)–(22).
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F;t+1 + ^ qt+1   ^ rH;t+1)
i
= 0;
We can now use equations (B.7)–(B.8) in the conditions above and solve for the steady-state vector of portfolio
shares and obtain equation (26).
C Derivation of equation (39)
Under model uncertainty, it is still true that (B.4) and (B.5) still hold and can be used to write (37) as
^ g
R













j [Et+1^ qt+1+j   Et^ qt+1+j]: (C.9)
Therefore, the left-hand side of the orthogonality condition (31) can be written as
(^ c
R










from which it follows that (31) implies equation (39).
D Derivation of equations (45)–(46)
In the approximating model
yt =  + Ayt 1 + et;
the vector of shocks et is distributed as a multivariate normal with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix 
.













36The approximating and the worst-case models are linked through the martingale increments g and g
 for the
agents of country H and F, respectively. We showed in Section 5 that in a ﬁrst-order approximation g and g
 are
related to the revisions in the expected future path of the respective consumption growth:
























in which we are allowing for diﬀerent  and 
.
Using equations (B.1)–(B.2) and a ﬁrst-order approximation of the ﬂow-budget constraint (10), we can solve
for the growth rate of domestic consumption, as a function of steady-state portfolio shares, asset returns and
labor income. It follows that we can write g and g
 as linear combinations of the VAR innovations:









in which vectors z and z
 depend on 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0( + q   r);
for country F, in which   and  
 are deﬁned in (B.3), and H  (I   A)
 1.
It follows that the probability distribution of the distorted model for the agent in country H, denoted by
~ f(et), is given by

















Completing the square ﬁnally allows us to write ~ f(et) as















in which w()   (   1)
z() is the mean distortion implied by the preference for robustness. Similarly, the
distorted probability distribution function for the agent in country F, ~ f
(et), is given by
~ f




























Equations (45)–(46) directly follow.
37